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Surprised by Method – Functional Method and 
Systems Theory 
Morten Knudsen  
Abstract: »Methodisch überrascht – funktionale Methode und Systemtheorie«. 
The paper is a contribution to the discussions on how to combine systems the-
ory and empirical research. The paper focuses on functional method, which on 
the one hand is claimed as the method of systems theory but on the other hand 
is often only mentioned in passing – in Niklas LUHMANN’s later works as 
well as in recent discussions on systems theory. The contention of the paper is 
that functional method can still be an important driving force in the develop-
ment of interesting empirical problematics and analyses. The first and major 
part of the paper is a reconstruction of main characteristics of functional 
method. It is demonstrated how the method generates observations and the 
question is raised about which problem(s) the method is a solution to. The sec-
ond part discusses functional method in relation to Niklas LUHMANN’s later 
theoretical developments, especially the theory of second order observation. 
The overall aim of the paper is to reconstruct central traits of functional 
method in order to demonstrate how it works, what its function is – and where 
its limitations might lie. 
Keywords: functional method; functional analysis; Luhmann; systems theory; 
second order observation; empirical studies. 
1. Introduction 
Several authors have recently discussed the relation between theory and em-
pirical research in systems theory as developed not least by Niklas LUHMANN 
(NASSEHI & SAAKE, 2002; ÅKERSTRØM ANDERSEN, 2003; BESIO & 
PRONZINI, 1999, 2008; RÄWEL, 2007; VOGD, 2005, 2007, 2009). This 
paper is a contribution to the discussions on how to combine systems theory 
and empirical research. The paper focuses on functional method, which on the 
one hand is claimed as the method of systems theory (LUHMANN, 1995, p.52) 
but on the other hand typically is only mentioned in the passing – in Niklas 
LUHMANN’s later works as well as in recent discussions on systems theory. 
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The limited attention to functional method may be because it sounds like it is to 
do with out of date Parsonian functionalism or some kind of social instrumen-
talism with which we do not want to be associated. This is, however, unfortu-
nate for several reasons. 
Functional method has been and still can be an important ingredient in the 
development of interesting theoretical and empirical problems, questions, and 
analyses. If we want systems theory to be more than a world scheme then we 
need methods which can help us generate further analyses. Without methods 
students and researchers are left with an overwhelmingly complex theory but 
no clear idea of how to make this complex theory fruitful in empirical research. 
Furthermore functional method had a key role in the way Niklas LUHMANN 
developed his own analyses. In order to understand systems theory we must 
understand the methods by which it was developed. Finally, all methods have 
limits, so in order to observe the limits of systems theoretical analyses a more 
explicit reflection on functional method is necessary. 
The first and major part of this paper is a reconstruction of main characteris-
tics of functional method the way Niklas LUHMANN defined and used it. As 
we shall see, the functional method can be characterized as a scheme for obser-
vation, a scheme observing in the frames of problem and solution. I shall use 
the same scheme and ask which problem(s) the functional method is a solution 
to. The second part discusses functional method in relation to Niklas 
LUHMANN’s later theoretical developments. The method was conceptualized 
by Niklas LUHMANN in the beginning of the 1960s, that is long before the 
introduction of concepts like autopoiesis, communication, and second order 
observation theory. Generally, Niklas LUHMANN was very attentive to the 
epistemological consequences of the theoretical developments. But when it 
comes to the functional method, he did not carry out any thorough re-
interpretations. This makes it relevant to reflect upon the relationship between 
the functional method and Niklas LUHMANN’s later theory of observation. As 
Niklas LUHMANN defines observation as an indication in the frames of a 
distinction (1997, 1998) the question is: what is the role of the prob-
lem/solution distinction vis-à-vis other prominent guiding distinctions in sys-
tems theory? 
The overall aim of the paper is to reconstruct central traits of functional 
method in order to demonstrate how it works and can contribute to not least 
empirical analyses. 
2. Functional Method – An Outline  
In this part I shall outline central aspects of functional method as defined and 
applied by Niklas LUHMANN. Different notions of function and functional 
method have been in use in the history of the social sciences (central names are 
Bronislaw MALINOWSKI, Alfred RADCLIFFE-BROWN, Talcot PARSONS, 
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Robert K. MERTON; see e.g. MERTON, 1963 [1957]; LUHMANN, 1991a 
[1970], pp.10f; JETZKOWITZ & STARK, 2003). In the following “functional 
method” refers to the way Niklas LUHMANN defines and uses it. 
In a reconstruction of functional method we face the problem that Niklas 
LUHMANN wrote his main methodological articles in the beginning of the 
1960s – that is 20-30 years before he wrote some of his major works. In Social 
Systems, Niklas LUHMANN’s comprehensive presentation of his general 
systems theory, he states that he will assume the use of functional method 
throughout (1995, p.52). The statement is followed by references to two articles 
which were originally published in 1962 and 1964 (LUHMANN, 1995, p.54, 
Note 107 and 109).1 This presupposition of functional method pervades Niklas 
LUHMANN’s later writings in which we find only sparse references to func-
tional method.2 In a situation in which it seems that functional method is just as 
much a habit, an implicit way of generating the analyses, as it is an explicit 
method, we must observe both the explicit discussions and the actual use of the 
method in order to reconstruct it. 
We will structure the reconstruction around the question: What is the func-
tion of functional method? Or in the terms of functional method: which prob-
lem is functional method a solution to? To start with we can focus on the con-
cept of function: what does “function” mean?  
2.1 Function and Problem  
A function can be defined as the unity of the difference between a problem and 
various equivalent solutions (LUHMANN, 2000a, p.116). A function is never 
only the solution, as the solution is only a solution to a specific problem. The 
problems on the other hand can be found nowhere else than in the problem-
solutions (LUHMANN, 1998, p.426). The problems are not observable as such, 
they are only detectable together with the solutions. Media for distribution deal 
for instance in different ways with the problem that it is improbable that the 
communication will reach its addressees. Printing expands the number of pos-
sible receivers (in time and space), but so do electronic media. Thus printing 
and electronic media are different solutions to the same problem of communi-
                                                             
1  The two articles “Funktion und Kausalität” (published 1962) and “Funktionale Methode 
und Systemtheorie” (published 1964) are reprinted in LUHMANN (1991a [1970]. 
2  The references to functional method are typically followed by a reference to the two articles 
from 1962 and 1964. For instance there are no references to the functional method neither 
in his major theory of society “Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft” (LUHMANN, 1997) nor 
in his work on organizational theory “Organisation und Entscheidung” (LUHMANN, 
2000b). In his book on science, LUHMANN does have a short discussion of aspects of the 
distinction between problem and solution, which is central in functional analysis. But there 
is no systematic discussion of functional method in the light of the theoretical developments 
of his systems theory during the 30 years since he published his first article on the func-
tional method. 
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cation reaching its addressees. The function is the unity of the problem of dis-
tribution and the different solutions to this problem. 
With function defined as the unity of a problem and various equivalent solu-
tions it is obvious that functional method also deals with problems and solu-
tions. Functional analysis relates in the final instance to problems and seeks to 
find solutions to these problems (LUHMANN, 1979, p.5). To generate analyses 
by means of problems raises the question of where these problems come from. 
A problem is not just there in itself, it must be constructed. That is the task of 
theory. Functional method is an analytical technique that can be worked out in 
abstract terms, but it depends on a substantial theory that can construct the 
problems that the method needs (LUHMANN, 1991a [1970], p.38). 
In the division of work between theory and method it is the task of the the-
ory to develop the problems that the phenomena can be seen as solutions to. 
This means that the problems generating the observations are themselves scien-
tific constructions. But as Peter FUCHS claims, it only makes sense to give 
problems this status, if they can be seen as something also generating the struc-
tures of the systems analyzed (2003, p.206). It is taken for granted that the 
phenomenon studied is already a solution to a problem and can therefore be 
reconstructed departing from a problem/solution scheme. 
In the 1960s complexity had the status of the central problem. Different 
phenomena like organizations, law, trust and power could be compared as 
different solutions to the same problem, that is the problem of reduction of 
complexity (LUHMANN, 1979). But as the systems theory develops, Niklas 
LUHMANN becomes more specific about the problems and he works on dif-
ferent types of problems. For instance function systems are solutions to differ-
ent problems (religion is a solution to different problem than law etc.). At the 
same time Niklas LUHMANN still works on more fundamental problems 
related to complexity. The concept of double contingency in particular has a 
central role as problem-concept (1995, pp.103ff). 
The relation between theory and method indicates one of the many circulari-
ties in systems theory. The method generates the analyses and the development 
of the theory. But the theory also influences the method, as the theory specifies 
the problems that the analyses may look to find solutions to. The method is 
both dependent on and independent of the theoretical developments. It is inde-
pendent as it insists on the distinction problem/solution as basic. It is dependent 
as the formulations of the actual problems and solutions depend on the theo-
retical developments. Thus “the problem” changes with the development of the 
theory. 
2.2 Equivalent Solutions 
Central to the functional method is the way it relates problems and solutions to 
each other. Contrary to what Niklas LUHMANN calls causal functionalism, he 
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does not wish to establish causal relations between problems and solutions. He 
does not claim that problems are causes and solutions effects in a deterministic 
way. Functions do not explain in the causal meaning of the word. Instead he 
claims that “The function is not a causal cause, but a regulative formula of 
meaning that organizes an arena for comparisons of equivalent solutions” 
(1991a [1970], p.14; my translation). Something is explained as a possible but 
not necessary solution to a problem, a contingent solution. 
In his earliest text on functionalism Niklas LUHMANN gives the concept of 
functional equivalents a central position. He sees Äquivalenzfunktionalismus 
[equivalence-functionalism] as an alternative to causal functionalism. The 
functional method means to compare equivalent solutions. The idea of func-
tional analyses is to open a limited field of comparisons (LUHMANN, 1991a 
[1970], p.13). It is equivalence functionalism because it studies solutions in the 
light of other solutions. 
Whereas Robert K. MERTON (1963 [1957]) saw the distinction between la-
tent and manifest as the gain of functionalism (pointing at latent, hidden func-
tions), Niklas LUHMANN claims that the gain lies in the establishing of possi-
bilities of comparison. He states that “... the functional method is finally a 
comparative one” (1995, p.54). What is compared is not identities, countries, 
companies or the like, but solutions. Trust and distrust are for instance func-
tional equivalents, as they are different solutions to the same problem, namely 
(the reduction of) complexity (LUHMANN, 1979). Also symbolically general-
ized media such as money, power and love are functional equivalents. The 
problem to which symbolically generalized media are a solution concerns the 
special problem of an improbable connection between selection and motivation 
of communicative events. 
We may sum up these preliminary statements by saying that functional 
method is formulated by Niklas LUHMANN as an observational technique 
(that is a method), that generates its observations by means of the distinction 
between problems and solutions. What a problem is depends on the theory that 
works together with functional method. The aim of functional method is not to 
establish causal relations between problems (causes) and solutions (effects). 
Instead the aim is to compare different solutions to the same problem: func-
tional method is a comparative method. The concept of functional equivalents 
is key. 
I will now exemplify how the functional method generates its theoretical 
and empirical analyses. After the examples I discuss which problems the func-
tional analysis is a solution to. 
2.3 Functional Method in Action  
In this part I will draw the contours of functional method further as I show how 
it performs in both theoretical and empirical analyses. As Niklas LUHMANN 
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works not least with meta-theoretical problems in his way of generating analy-
ses the examples are partly quite abstract. 
For Niklas LUHMANN, in the 1960s, complexity was the central problem 
generating observations. His small but influential book on trust can exemplify 
how the problem of complexity is used in the analyses. He writes  
Complexity, and the capacity for dealing with it, however, is not just the hid-
den motive, the unifying purpose behind the whole conceptual orientation of 
the functional method, it is at the same time the most fundamental substantive 
problem for functional research (1979, p.5). 
Complexity means that the world contains more possibilities than can be real-
ized (p.6).3 What is going to happen in the future is uncertain and unknown, we 
always know too little. Trust understood as confidence in one’s own expecta-
tions can be analyzed as a solution to the problem of complexity as it reduces 
the complexity. Trust compensates for an element of uncertainty related to 
other people’s behavior. If everything possible should be expected all the time 
it would be difficult to do anything. Trust can be compared to other ways of 
reducing complexity – for instance distrust, which is a functional equivalent for 
trust (p.71). Both trust and distrust seem to be self-fuelling (p.74). The com-
parison opens up the question of when and how one solution is replaced by 
another, that is, when distrust replaces trust or vice versa. The comparison also 
shows different consequential problems arising from the solutions, which can 
be the point of departure for further analyses – how are they solved? We may 
summarize the analytical practice in the following figure:  
Figure 1: From Problem to Solution 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure shows how the analysis is generated by means of a basic theoretical 
problem which gives rise to a) analysis of solutions to the problem and b) com-
parison of the different solutions. The task of the analysis is to find solutions to 
the problem and compare different, relevant aspects of these solutions to one 
another. In the first outlines of functional method the analytical movement 
primarily goes from known problem (complexity) to solutions that are yet to be 
investigated (reduction of complexity). 
                                                             
3  See also Paul CILLIERS (1998) for enlightening discussions of the complexity concept. 
Complexity     Trust/distrust 
 
 Problem     Solutions 
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2.3.1 Examples of Problem/Solution Relations  
As mentioned in the introduction references to functional method become 
sparse in Niklas LUHMANN’s later works. Nonetheless, the functional method 
seems to be an integral part of the development of the analyses. Let me point to 
some examples. In “Social Systems” (1995), Niklas LUHMANN defines com-
munication, and not action, as the basic element of social systems. Complexity 
is still an important concept, but as a general concept for the problem generat-
ing of the analyses it seems more adequate to claim that it is improbability. 
Communication and social systems are improbable – that is the starting point in 
Niklas LUHMANN’s later analyses (1995, pp. 114ff., 2009 [1981]). Improb-
ability is the problem that generates the analyses as it raises the question of 
how communication is made more likely in spite of its improbability. Two 
steps now characterize the functional analysis: a) the development of a perspec-
tive showing the improbability of the studied phenomenon (= the problem) and 
b) the analysis of the phenomenon studied showing how it is made probable in 
spite of its improbability (i.e. the solution). 
The improbability can be qualified and specified: in which sense is the 
communication improbable? This is where theory comes in as the functional 
method does not provide an answer to this question. Basic concepts of systems 
theory (like complexity, selection, contingency, and paradox) are constructed in 
ways that make communication improbable – and thus in need of explanation. 
The scheme below can summarize some of the main problem/solution-
relations in Niklas LUHMANN’s later works.  
Table 1: Examples of Problem/Solution-Relations 
in Niklas LUHMANN’s Later Works. 
Problems The problem explained Solutions 
Double contingency 
(LUHMANN, 1995, 
pp.103ff.) 
Communication is improbable 
because of the contingency of 
the selections of ego and alter – 
too much openness can paralyze 
communication 
Structures limiting the 
expectations to communi-
cation 
Contact 
(LUHMANN, 1997, 
pp.202ff.) 
How to make contact with 
someone not present. It is 
improbable that communication 
will find persons who are not 
present 
Media of diffusion 
Motivation/connectivity 
(LUHMANN, 1997, 
pp.316ff., 1979, 
pp.109ff.) 
How to increase the probability 
that communication is accepted 
and used as a premise for fur-
ther communication 
Symbolically generalized 
media 
Paradox 
(LUHMANN, 1991b, 
2000b) 
Paradoxes giving undecidability 
and pointing to the contingency 
of communication 
Invisibilizations and 
displacements of the 
paradoxes to less disturb-
ing places. 
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The different problems are interrelated by the fact that Niklas LUHMANN has 
placed communication as the basic operation of social systems. Communica-
tion consists of elements with the form of events. They disappear the moment 
after they have happened – therefore connectivity is crucial for the reproduc-
tion of communication. The basic problem of social systems is not to secure a 
unity with certain characteristics, but the reproduction of elements that are 
constantly disappearing (LUHMANN, 1995, p.55). 
Let met unpack one of the problems in Table 1 namely the problem of para-
dox. The paradox is – like complexity – one of the problem-concepts, and a 
concept that becomes more prevalent in the 1990s (LUHMANN, 1991a [1970], 
1993a, 1993b, 1996). In relation to management studies his idea of the para-
doxical decision is central. According to Niklas LUHMANN, an organization 
is a network of recursively connected decisions (2000b). A decision is an indi-
cation in the frames of a distinction which has the form of an alternative. This 
means that the other side of the alternative could have been indicated – other-
wise it would not be a decision but the result of a calculation. The decision 
fixes contingency and absorbs uncertainty as it indicates one side of the alterna-
tive: this and not that. But communicating itself as a decision it cannot help co-
communicating that it could also have been made differently: the other side of 
the alternative could have been indicated or could have been indicated in the 
frames of another distinction (LUHMANN, 2000b, p.147). This clash between 
message and information makes connectivity less likely: why connect to a 
decision which itself says that it could also have been made otherwise? It is this 
analysis of the paradoxical form of decisions and the inherent problem of con-
nectivity that generates Niklas LUHMANN’s theory and observations of or-
ganized communication (2000b, pp.123ff.). At the core of Niklas 
LUHMANN’s way of doing organizational theory is the question: how do 
organizations manage the paradox, the lack of necessity, the contingency of 
their decisions? As the organizations exist they must have managed the para-
doxes. This leads to the question of how organizations de-paradoxify their 
decisions (for empirical analyses on this basis see KNUDSEN, 2005, 2006, 
2007). 
The example above illustrates how Niklas LUHMANN also uses functional 
method in his later writings as he generates his analyses by means of problems 
and solutions. I will now exemplify a similar situation in empirical system 
theoretical analyses. The examples are limited to a few analyses made by re-
searchers at Copenhagen Business School. When it comes to management 
studies several researchers at the school have been experimenting with analyti-
cal possibilities in systems theory since the end of the 1990s. The purpose of 
presenting the examples here is to show how functional method is at work – 
even though it is not mentioned explicitly in the articles.  
In Niels ÅKERSTRØM ANDERSEN and Asmund BORN’s study (2003, 
2008) of the emergence of a semantic of passion about the relationship between 
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employee and organization in the Danish public sector we find an implicit 
functional analysis. The semantic analysis is accompanied by an analysis of 
new differentiations of the public sector. The emerging semantics of passion is 
interpreted as a solution to problems created by these new structures. Structure 
and semantic are related to each other as problems and solutions. Annegrete 
NIELSEN, Morten KNUDSEN and Katrine FINKE (2008) is another example 
of the important but implicit use of the functional method. In an analysis of an 
organization responsible for public health activities in Copenhagen a study is 
carried out of how the organization draws its boundaries to the environment – 
observing the organization against the distinction system/environment. The 
drawing of boundaries is interpreted as solutions firstly to a certain concept of 
health, secondly to problems following the first kind of boundary-drawing. 
Holger HOJLUND and Anders LA COUR’s analysis of standardization of 
elderly care and how solutions are developed as responses to problems created 
by earlier solutions (2003) is also a good example of the implicit use of func-
tional method. As with the other examples mentioned above, Holger  
HOJLUND and Anders LA COUR do not fixate their analysis on to a basic 
problem; instead they locate both problems and solutions at an empirical level 
– drawing on system theoretical concepts in order to do this. The analysis is 
developed in a chain of problem/solution/consequent problem/solution. 
Even though the analyses mentioned above relate their analyses to different 
analytical strategies (ÅKERSTRØM ANDERSEN, 2003) they all implicitly 
draw on the functional method-distinction between problem and solution. They 
do this as a way of explaining phenomena like the emergence of semantics of 
passion or they do it as a way of generating further analyses on the basis of the 
problems diagnosed in the analyses. It also seems that the problem/solution 
distinction is involved when the analyses explain dynamics in the studied de-
velopments (for instance semantic changes do not explain themselves, they 
remain rather descriptive and are therefore in need of supplementary analyses 
in order to acquire explanatory capacity). 
Summing up, the functional method still plays an important role in systems 
theoretical analyses – both in Niklas LUHMANN’s later works and in the 
works of other researchers using systems theory for empirical analyses. But the 
relationship between problem and solution seems to have become less linear 
and more circular. This calls for a reflection on the circularity of the prob-
lem/solution distinction.  
2.3.2 Circularity in the Problem/Solution Relation  
Some of the examples above may give the impression that problems are theo-
retically given and that solutions are something we can study empirically. This 
may be so in the presentation of the research, but not in the research itself. As 
the theory develops and becomes more complex the analysis of problems also 
develops. It becomes possible to define the problems more specifically and it 
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becomes possible to start with the solutions and ask which problem a commu-
nication system is a solution to. The analytical move is not (only) from problem 
to different solutions, but also the other way round: from solution to problem. 
For instance, Niklas LUHMANN asks what the function of law is. That is: 
which problem is solved by differentiating specialized legal norms ending up 
with a legal system (2004, p.142). The analytical movement inherent in this 
question is from known solution (the differentiating of specialized legal norms) 
to unknown problems. The specification of the problem is the result of the 
analysis. Both problem and solution are results of investigation. Or as Andreas 
PHILIPPOPOULOS-MIHALOPOULOS puts it: “Indeed, function is the ques-
tion, rather than the causal answer” (2010, p.68). 
Systems theory is characterized by circularity. Niklas LUHMANN distin-
guishes between two forms of method a) deductive methods which take the 
starting or the achieved position for certain b) cybernetic methods which oper-
ate without guaranteed positions. The certainty in the cybernetic analysis in-
heres instead in the process, as the background can be revised if the process 
gives occasion for it. The process both serves as a guide for further steps in the 
analysis and as a validation (or questioning) of the position already achieved 
(LUHMANN, 1998, p.418). This is important when it comes to the relation 
between problem and solution – a relation that is also circular. We may illus-
trate the point with a parallel to the hermeneutical distinction between question 
and answer (GADAMER, 1990, pp.386ff.; MARQUARD, 1981, pp.117ff.). 
According to Hans-Georg GADAMER to understand something means to 
understand it as an answer to a question. You do not understand it, if you do 
not know the question to which it is an answer. Different questions will 
enlighten the text in different ways. This circularity between question/answer is 
parallel to the relation between problem/solution. The problem becomes a 
problem through the analysis. Thus research is as much about analyzing the 
problems that something is a solution to, as it is about analyzing how problems 
are solved. In empirical research, it is fruitful to follow both problems and 
solutions – and not least to ask: which problem is this a solution to? In the 
presentation of the research, though, the process of investigation may be hidden 
and the results presented as a solution to a problem that seems to have been 
known all along – for instance paradoxes of decision-making. 
Figure 2 illustrates how the analytical movement between problem and solu-
tion can go both ways. The relationship between problem and solution is circu-
lar and analytically it is possible to change the points of departure.4 
We may supplement Figure 1 like this (Figure 2): 
                                                             
4  It is of course also possible to follow chains of problems, solutions, consequent problems, 
solutions, consequent problems etc. 
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Figure 2: Circular Analytical Movements Between Problem and Solution 
 
 
2.4 The Function of Functional Method 
Now let us return to the question regarding the function of functional method 
and ask which problem the distinction problem/solution is a solution to. The 
short answer is that the problem to which functional method is a solution is the 
problem of how to interrupt the continuity between reality and knowledge, how 
to gain a distance to the object of study so we can learn something that we did 
not already know. Niklas LUHMANN claims that what  
... is at issue here is ... first and foremost an analytic interest: to break through 
the illusion of normality, to disregard experience and habit ... The methodo-
logical recipe for this is to seek theories that can succeed in explaining the 
normal as improbable. From the functionalistic perspective this can occur with 
the help of problem formulations that make it possible to represent the normal 
experimental contents of the life world as an already-successful solution to the 
problem, but one that could also, perhaps, be otherwise (1995, p.114). 
Methodology is often related to questions of control of the analyses and avoid-
ance of arbitrariness. As Armin NASSEHI and Irmhold SAAKE put it: qualita-
tive methodology focuses on the removal or control of contingency (2002, 
p.71). The function of functional method is, on the contrary, not control.5 In-
stead it is a solution to the problem of how to enable scientific research to 
surprise itself (LUHMANN, 1997, p.37). Sociology is part of the object it 
studies; it is always-already permeated with concepts and understandings from 
the object it wants to study. An interruption, a creation of a distance between 
knowledge and reality, is a condition of possibility for surprise, that is for the 
production of new information. Functional method creates such a distance as it 
uses problems (for instance improbability) in light of which well-known phe-
                                                             
5  Or to be more exact “research guided by system theory produces knowledge while seeking 
to increase both the awareness of contingency and the non-arbitrariness of combinations at 
the same time” (BESIO & PRONZINI, 2008, p.16). 
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nomena may look different. It is one thing to manage the techniques of qualita-
tive or quantitative research and another to create interesting problems and 
surprising analyses. 
The identification of functional equivalents introduces contingency. In a 
functional perspective everything becomes contingent, as it is offered for com-
parison with other possibilities. Niklas LUHMANN states that  
the gain that functionalization tries to obtain is not the problem-solving in it-
self (as the problems most often have been solved long ago). Instead the gain 
it tries to obtain is related to the reference to a plurality of functionally equiva-
lent problem-solving; that is in the establishing of alternatives or functional 
equivalence (2000a, pp.116f; my translation). 
The production of functional equivalents makes it possible to compare the 
studied phenomenon with other possibilities – a comparison which also in-
cludes a distance to the specific solutions which are seen in the light of alterna-
tives (LUHMANN, 1991a [1970], p.36). The comparison shows the artificiality 
of the taken for grantedness, but it also produces insight about the solutions 
being compared, which are seen in the light of each other. Furthermore, Niklas 
LUHMANN claims that equivalent functionalism must be understood as a 
suggestion for looking for other, functional equivalent problem-solvings 
(LUHMANN, 2000c, p.82). Thus functional method is a way to give systems 
theory a kind of dynamo. I will return to this later. 
LUHMANN states that “Functions are always constructions of an observer” 
(2000a, p.118; my translation). Pursuing the question of the function of func-
tional method and the establishment of functional equivalence we should intro-
duce an observer and ask “who is the observer?,” when inquiries are to be 
made about the function of functional method. It seems that Niklas 
LUHMANN operates not only with science as the observational perspective, he 
also looks at the function of functional method from a societal point of view. 
For instance he claims that theories make comparisons possible, and compari-
sons increase the area of possible practical substitutions (1998, p.409). The 
purpose of comparative method focusing on functional equivalents thus also 
seems to be to enhance the amount of possible solutions to “practical” prob-
lems, which could be understood as problems outside the scientific system. We 
may state that the problem that functional method is a solution to is at the same 
time the problem of how to open up society for a greater number of alterna-
tives, “to open up what lies at hand for a sidelong glance at other possibilities” 
(LUHMANN, 1995, p.54). 
Above I have presented an outline of the function of functional method. We 
shall now proceed to the second part of the article in which functional method 
shall be related to second order observation theory. 
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3. Functional Method and 
Second Order Observation Theory  
Niklas LUHMANN’s two basic articles on functional method were – as men-
tioned – originally published in 1962 and 1964. In the 1980s and 1990s, his 
theory and analyses developed with many innovations. For instance, communi-
cation replaced action as the basic concept constituting social systems, the 
concept of autopoiesis was given a central position in the theory, a theory of 
observation (followed not least by references to G.S. BROWN’s “Laws of 
Form” [1969]) was introduced, and distinctions and paradoxes were moved up 
front. Based on readings of Niklas LUHMANN’s theory of observation, I now 
discuss the function of functional method in the context of these theoretical 
innovations. If functional method is a way to generate potentially surprising 
observations, then how does this method relate to Niklas LUHMANN’s theory 
of observations? 
The concept of observation is defined as Unterscheiden und Bezeichnen 
[distinction and indication] (LUHMANN, 1997, p.69, 1998, pp.68ff.). It is not 
possible to indicate something without distinguishing. Observation is not bound 
to visual perceptions; the concept of observation covers any praxis of distin-
guishing indications, including actions (p.757, Note 309). If you make an indi-
cation you also draw a distinction. Communication is for instance also distin-
guishing indications. For the observation the distinction is itself not observable 
in the moment of the observation. The blind spot is the unity of the difference. 
Focusing on communication, systems theory can be described as observations 
of observations (i.e. second order observation). For instance, it can be observed 
how the economic system observes (its environment or itself), how the legal, 
the religious or the political system observe. Different systems construct their 
environment differently in the way they observe it. This means saying goodbye 
to the way the world “really” is – instead we have different distinctions con-
structing the world, each in their own way and with no common denominator. 
This theory of observation has consequences for how scientific research is 
carried out. The scientific observation of observations is also bound to the 
distinctions applied. The objects studied can be constructed in many different 
ways – depending on the distinctions framing the analyses. In his book on 
analytical strategies, Niels ÅKERSTRØM ANDERSEN (2003) has tried to 
extract some of Niklas LUHMANN’s most important distinctions that form 
different observations. The guiding distinctions are the core of the analytical 
strategy. An analytical strategy is defined as  
a second-order strategy for the observation of how ‘the social’ emerges in ob-
servations (or enunciations or articulations). The elaboration of an analytical 
strategy involves shaping a specific gaze that allows the environment to ap-
pear as consisting of the observations of other people or systems (ÅKER-
STRØM ANDERSEN, 2003, p.VI). 
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Niels ÅKERSTRØM ANDERSEN condenses some of the systems theoretical 
analytical strategies in the scheme below. 
Table 2: Some Systems Theoretical Analytical Strategies 
(ÅKERSTRØM ANDERSEN, 2003, pp.78ff.)  
Analytical strategy Guiding distinction 
Semantic Condensation/meaning 
Form analysis Unity/difference 
Systems analysis System/environment 
Differentiation analysis Similarity/difference 
Media analysis Form/medium 
 
In a second order perspective, theory becomes the display of basic guiding 
distinctions and thus programs for observation. Similarly, functional method 
can be characterized as a program for observation characterized by the guiding 
distinction problem/solution. This makes it relevant to discuss the prob-
lem/solution distinction vis-à-vis other guiding distinctions. The condensation 
or extraction of systems theoretical gazes, of different types of guiding distinc-
tions (Leitdifferenzen in German) means it is relevant to ask if these guiding 
distinctions can be seen as functional equivalents to the distinction prob-
lem/solution associated with functional method. Let us follow functional analy-
sis and make a comparison between the problem/solution-distinction and other 
prominent guiding distinctions in systems theory. 
Functional method was ascribed the function of making phenomena appear 
contingent. The different guiding distinctions we today find active in systems 
theory seem to be functional equivalents when it comes to the demonstration of 
contingency of a phenomenon studied. For instance, historical-semantic analy-
ses can historicize our current semantics and thus show their contingency. 
Form-analyses can show the paradox of ways of observing. Analyses of differ-
entiations can show the existence of alternative forms of differentiation. Today, 
the possibilities for creating a distance to the phenomenon studied abound and 
contingency pervades the entire theoretical architecture of systems theory. [46]  
The statements above could indicate that functional method has lost its cen-
tral function in the construction of systems theoretical analyses. But the fact 
that the problem/solution distinction still is very active when analyses are car-
ried out indicates another conclusion: that functional method today is a solution 
to another problem than the creation of contingency and analytical distance. 
The hypothesis I shall pursue in the following is that functional method is a 
solution to the problem of dynamics, of how to produce further analyses, how 
to make further operations connect to earlier ones and point forwards. 
A semantic analysis can be done and finished – but how is it connected to 
other analyses? How does it avoid a situation where communication simply 
stops after the analysis, maybe with a tired “and so what?” Here it seems that 
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the problem/solution distinction can take the analysis further by asking which 
problem the described semantics is a solution to. Or: which problems does it 
create? And how are these problems solved? Analyses of differentiation can 
form another example: Along an analysis of the differentiations (using the 
guiding distinction similarity/difference) in, for instance, an organization, one 
can bring the analysis further by asking which problem is this differentiation a 
solution to and which problems does it cause? The problem/solution distinction 
is used in order to move the analysis of differentiations. An analysis of a cer-
tain way of drawing a boundary between system and environment may lead to 
the question: which problem is this boundary a solution to (and could there 
have been other, functional equivalent, solutions) – or we can instead ask 
which problems does it create. An analysis of the form of decision raises the 
problem: how is the paradox of decision making managed? This means that it 
is the problem/solution distinction that brings the analysis further. 
Functional method secures what Niklas LUHMANN calls a rest-liquidity 
vis-à-vis theoretical determinations (1998, p.423). The distinction prob-
lem/solution places a restlessness in the analyses, which presses the analyses 
further. It is the problem/solution distinction which makes the singular analysis 
transgress its own boundaries; the distinction becomes a solution to the prob-
lem of how to move analyses further. Other guiding distinctions frame and 
condition the analyses. The problem/solution distinction moves the analyses, 
gives them a restlessness and an internal dynamic. It seems that concepts like 
dynamic, restlessness, movement are closer to the actual function of functional 
method than concepts like comparison and contingency. Functional method is a 
way to avoid closure of theories and analyses. After an analysis, it can always 
ask which problem does this raise and how is it solved – or: which problem is 
this a solution to. 
The problem/solution distinction has a peculiar form: it is at the same time 
empty and dynamic. It is empty, as it does not itself make any claim about what 
a problem is – this must be worked out theoretically and analytically. Theory 
can give content to the problem. The form stays open for theoretical changes. It 
is dynamic as it can make analyses, guided by other distinctions, advance and 
transgress themselves. The problem/solution distinction seems to be a 
homodromous distinction; it runs together with other distinctions and opens 
new questions. It makes the other distinctions move. 
We can now supplement the answers given in part one regarding the func-
tion of functional method: the function is not only to create comparisons and 
contingency (functions for which other guiding distinctions in systems theory 
seem to have become functionally equivalent). Instead the term “generating 
observations” is central. The point being that functional method drives the 
analyses forwards, that it generates further questions. We can interpret func-
tional method as the solution provided by systems theory to the general prob-
lem of communicative connectivity. Communication has the form of events 
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and if communication is to continue, further events must connect to earlier ones 
and point forwards to future events. Without that kind of connectivity commu-
nication simply stops. The problem/solution distinction is a way to fuel this 
process in systems theoretical analyses. Instead of conclusions which stop the 
communication, we get new problems which call for further analy-
sis/communication. 
4. Final Questions 
In the introduction, I asked whether the theoretical developments of systems 
theory have had any effects on functional method. Focusing on the function of 
functional method it seems that there is a shift in the problem to which func-
tional method is a solution. The development of theoretical techniques and 
analyses, which just as well as functional method can enlighten the contingency 
of the analyzed phenomena, means it is relevant to ask if functional method can 
be seen as a solution to another problem. I have suggested that functional 
method and the distinction between problem and solution is a solution to a 
dynamic problem: how to make the analyses move on, reach out for further 
analyses, create an internal pressure for further communication. We can say 
that the problem/solution is the motion principle of systems theory. 
This motion principle seems to be mirrored by, or co-produce, an assump-
tion that also problems outside of systems theory are the motion principle for 
communication. In 1962 Niklas LUHMANN criticized the “optimistic assump-
tion” that problems themselves mobilize the causes for their solutions (1991a 
[1970], p.11). But it is exactly such a figure Niklas LUHMANN himself seems 
to use when he later talks about double contingency as a “basic problem that 
operates autocatalytically” (1995, p.122). It is autocatalytical in that the ap-
pearance of the problem also initiates a process for solving it (pp.117ff.; RIT-
SERT, 1988, p.175). 
There is an isomorphism between the functional method and assumptions 
about what moves social systems. Niklas LUHMANN puts it the following 
way:  
Of course, when we speak of problems here we do not mean only the artefacts 
of the art of scientific problematization. Although the concept of problems, the 
concept of double contingency, and the concept of autocatalysis are formed in 
the system-specific context of scientific efforts and must find their home, 
function, and confirmation there, they mean real facts in the domain of the ob-
jects to be analyzed. Thus we maintain that there are problems – and not only 
for science. Reality reacts to the problems that occur within it by selection. 
Problems are the factually effective catalytic agents of social life (1995, 
p.122). 
This is also why Jürgen RITSERT can claim that “problem” rises to be the 
most general expression of the motion principle (Bewegungsprinzip, RITSERT 
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1988, p.175). The functional method is close-knit with the assumption that 
problems move social systems. 
It seems to be a basic assumption in systems theory that problems are effec-
tive catalytical agents of both systems theory itself and of social life. By way of 
a conclusion we can ask three final questions connected with this assumption:  
1) How can we conceptualize the functionalism that is actually at work in 
systems theory? While it is obviously not an old school causal functionalism 
the concept of equivalent functionalism seems to miss central characteristics 
of the function of functional method.6 To establish and compare equivalents 
does not seem to be the central function of functional analysis any longer.  
2) As we have seen, the concept of problem must be defined theoretically. But 
it also seems that the form (i.e. the difference problem/solution) in itself lim-
its what can be put into it. Problems have solutions but can we not imagine 
some agents of social life that do not have solutions? That is: Agents that 
cannot be observed within the frames of functional method.  
3) If the function of functional method is to move the analyses as a kind of 
autocatalytic fuel – and if this method has a blind spot when it comes to so-
cial agents that cannot be given the form of the difference between problem 
and solution – can we then invent some functional equivalents? Or is the i-
dentity of systems theory so closely related to the distinction between prob-
lem and solution that we cannot observe beyond problems and solutions 
without leaving systems theory? 
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